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Abstract- Game theory is a powerful analytical tool for modeling decision makers 
strategies, behaviors and interactions. A Decision maker’s ac and decisions can benefit or 
negatively impact other decision makers interests. Game theory has been broadly used in 
economics, politics and engineering field. For example, game theory can model decision 
making procedure of different companies competing with each other to maximize their 
profit.  
In this chapter, we present a brief introduction of game theory formulation and its 
applications. The focus of the chapter is noncooperative Stackelberg game model and its 
applications in solving power system related problems. These applications include but not 
limited to; expanding transmission network, improving power system reliability, 
containing market power in the electricity market, solving power system dispatch, 
executing demand response and allocating resource in a wireless system.  Finally, this 
chapter elaborates on solving a game theory problem through an example. 
Keywords- Game theory, Stackelberg game, Nash equilibrium, Utility function, Smart Grid, 
Demand response, demand-side management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1. Introduction 
Operation of power system relays on various entities with different objectives, sometimes with 
conflicting goals, and game theory lends itself really well to formulate this decision-making 
space. Game theory is a powerful tool for modeling and understanding strategies that can 
maximize a player’s benefit in the context of other players’ strategies. In the following chapter, 
we discuss the applications of game theory in solving power system related problems [1].  
 Power market 
Electricity market plays a crucial role in the operation of every power system market. The two 
pillars of any electricity market are generation companies’ production bids and large consumers’ 
consumption offers. 
Generation companies bid production blocks and associated prices to the market’s independent 
operator. Then, the system operator clears the market by determining the accepted bids [2]. This 
is a bi-level problem that can be modeled as a multi-leader-followers game problem. Game 
theory can be also leveraged to a model participation of renewable power producers in the 
electricity market [3, 4]. 
 Power system dispatch 
Reliable and cost-effective operation of a power system is the primary responsibility of power 
system operators. Ever increasing penetration level of interment power production resources 
challenges generation and consumption balance and endangers reliability of the grid operation 
[5]. The zero-sum two-stage game is used in [6] to model a robust power dispatch in a power 
system. Along the same line,[7] models preventive and corrective actions in the unit commitment 
problem with a three-stage dynamic game.  
 Transportation network application 
Game theory has been widely used for solving electric vehicle coordination and optimization 
problems. In this regards, [8, 9] leverage game theory to derive optimal charging schedules for a 
group of electric vehicles in the context of power system contstraints. 
 Power system control 
Power system control strategies are designed around handling disturbances in the power grid. A 
disturbance can occur in both generation and consumption sides. One of the most effective 
robust control tools for dealing with disturbance is the differential game model. In this 
regard[10] leverages the differential game model to control disturbances of production and load 
sides of the power system. Also, the coordination between tie-line scheduling and frequency 
control is modeled based on the concept of the cooperative game [11]. 
 
 Transmission expansion planning  
Transmission expansion planning (TEP) problem is aimed at determining optimal configuration 
for expansion of electricity network while ensuring the network’s reliability. Given the enormous 
size of demand and supply scenario sets, installing a new line can be complex. In this regards, 
authors in [12] provide an overview of game theory based methods to solve TEP.  
2.1. Game Theory definition 
Game theory allows for mathematical modeling of interactions between decision-makers in the 
case that players’ decisions influence each other directly. In a non-cooperative game theory, 
decision-makers are expected to act rational and selfish because they need to maximize their own 
benefits. On the other hand, in the cooperative game decision makers compete with each other 
while collaborating to fulfill an external enforcement (e.g., contract) [13-15].  
2.1.1 Elements of a game 
Each game includes the following elements:  
Player set: Number of players, denoted by 𝑁 
Strategy set:  A set of actions for each player 𝑖 which is denoted by 𝐴𝑖. The whole game space is 
obtained by Cartesian product of players actions, i.e., 𝐴 = 𝐴1 × 𝐴2 × … × 𝐴𝑛. Defining𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝑖, 
then (𝑎𝑖, 𝑎−𝑖) can be assigned to the player 𝑖. Where𝑎𝑖 denotes the player 𝑖 strategy while 𝑎−𝑖 
denotes other players’ strategies. 
Utility functions: The utility function of player 𝑖  denoted by ui(ai, a−i)  which measure the 
utility outcome for player 𝑖 based on its strategy and other players’ strategies. In a game theory 
players are considered rational meaning they are looking for the best strategy to maximize their 
benefit (utility) function.   
2.1.2  Decision rules: 
Decision makings are executed based on specific set of rules. The process that players follow for 
selecting their strategies is called decision rules. In the following, we present decision rules that 
players are obliged to follow.  
 Best response dynamic Rule: 
Each player selects the best strategy based on other players’ strategies to maximize self-benefit.  
 Better Response Dynamic Rule: 
Each time that a player executes a strategy, it is expected that this new policy increases that 
player’s utility in comparison with its previous decision. A strategy can be selected randomly 
which may not be necessarily the best strategy. Note there is a trade-off between the convergence 
and complexity. Specifically, improving response of dynamic models can slow down the 
convergence 
2.1.3. Scheduling decision rules 
Players should make their decision based on a specific time pattern. In general, we have four 
types of scheduling decision rules as follows: 
Synchronous decision rule: In this scheduling decision rules, at each time step all players make 
their decisions simultaneously. 
Round robin decision rule: Players make their decision sequentially until a decision making 
round ends.  
Random decision rule: At each time step, a player plays randomly. 
Asynchronous decision rule: At each time a random set of players make their decision 
simultaneously. Note this is the most commonly used rule. 
2.1.4. Nash equilibrium, existence, and uniqueness  
In the context of game theory, Nash equilibrium defines a steady state that all players are already 
selected their best strategy to maximize their benefits.  
Mathematically, Nash equilibrium {N, Ai, Ui} is defined as a profile si ∈ S of actions of player 
𝑖 ∈  𝑁 that lead to 
ui(si
∗, s−i
∗ ) ≥ ui(si, s−i
∗ ) 
In other words, player 𝑖 cannot change the strategy from si
∗ to 𝑠𝑖  and achieves a better utility. 
Therefore, all players prefer to stay at this equilibrium point. In general, a game can have zero, 
one or more Nash equilibrium points. The theorem below discusses the conditions for achieving 
the Nash equilibrium. 
Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem: A strategic game {𝑁, (𝐴𝑖), (𝑢𝑖)} has a Nash equilibrium if, for 
all 𝑖 ∈  𝑁, the action set 𝐴𝑖  of player 𝑖 is a non-empty compact convex subset of a Euclidian 
space and the utility function 𝑢𝑖 is continuous and quasi-concave on 𝐴𝑖 [13]. 
This theorem guarantees that a problem has at least one Nash equilibrium point, but it doesn’t 
prove the uniqueness of that point. Therefore, the game problem can have several Nash points. 
There are other theorems concerning the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium point. In this regard, a 
well-recognized theorem is a supermodular game that details the required conditions for 
achieving a unique Nash point. 
Supermodular game: A game is supermodular in the case that a game space makes a lattice and 
all utility functions are supermodular as well.  
Note, X is a lattice if: 
∀ 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑋: 𝑎 ∧ 𝑏 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑎 ∨ 𝑏 ∈ 𝑋 while 𝑎 ∨ 𝑏 = 𝑆𝑢𝑃(𝑎, 𝑏), 𝑎 ∧ 𝑏 = 𝑖𝑛𝑓(𝑎, 𝑏) and 𝑓: 𝑋 → ℝ 
In this lattice we can call a game supermodular if: 
∀ 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑋: 𝑓(𝑎) + 𝑓(𝑏) ≤ 𝑓(𝑎 ∧ 𝑏) + 𝑓(𝑎 ∨ 𝑏) 
 
Reference [16], simplifies this mathematically complex definition and presents sufficient conditions for a 
supermodularity of a game [16]. 
Theorem: A game can be identified as a supermodular game, if the action space of each player is a closed 
subset on a real space  and response function satisfies the following constraint, 
∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁:
𝜕2𝑢𝑖(𝑎)
𝜕𝑎𝑖𝜕𝑎𝑗
≥ 0 
These games enjoy important properties including: 
1) There is at least one Nash equilibrium point for these games. 
2) Under the decision rule, the best response and synchronous and asynchronous timing rules 
converge to the unique Nash equilibrium point. 
3) If the best response of each player BRi(a) satisfies the following conditions, the supermodular 
game will have a unique Nash equilibrium: 
 
 Uniqueness: BRi(a) = {bi ∈ Ai: ui(bi, a−i) ≥ ui(ai, a−i)} is a singleton for all a. 
 Positivity: ∀i ∈ N, a ∈ A: BRi(a) > 0 
 Scalability: ∀i ∈ N, α > 1, 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴: 𝛼𝐵Ri(a) > 𝐵Ri(𝛼a) 
So far, we have described the basics of game theory. The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to 
presenting Stackelberg Game which is commonly used to analyze and model power system related 
problems.  
2.2.  Stackelberg Game 
The Stackelberg leadership game is a strategic game in which players are divided into to two groups; 
leader and follower. This game is based on two stages. At the first stage, the players of the leader group 
select their strategies and act on them. At the second stage, the follower group chooses and execute their 
strategies according to the leader group actions. This game is built on the assumption that leader players 
know the impact of their actions on other players. Moreover, there is no way for followers to disregard the 
leaders’ actions. 
Usually, the Stackelberg game defines the situation that a set of players have specific privileges that allow 
them to move first. Leaders must also be committed to followers. Once a leader makes a decision, it can 
no longer change the selected policy, because it is committed to that action. 
2.2.1: Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) 
In order to solve the Stackelberg game, we have to find a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. 
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is the strategic vector that is the best strategy for each player 
with the assumption that the strategy is stable for other players. This further implies that each 
player in each sub-player plays according to a Nash equilibrium.  
The game takes place in two steps. At the first step, the lead player calculates the best followers’ 
response. In other words, leader calculates followers’ responses to its actions. Then the leader 
predicts follower's responses and chooses the strategy and action to maximize its profit. At the 
second step, a follower observes strategies chosen by the leader. At the equilibrium state, 
follower selects the leader’s expected value as a response to the leader action.  
Therefore, to calculate the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, at first we need to calculate the 
best-response functions of the followers in backward induction. In order to better comprehend the 
procedure of finding the equilibrium point in a Stackelberg game, we have provided the following 
example. 
 
Example 2-1: Calculating Nash Equilibrium in a Stackelberg game  
Assume a Stackelberg game that includes two players (a leader and a follower) and utility 
function for each of leader or follower are given as 
Π1 = 𝑝(𝑞1, 𝑞2). 𝑞1 − 𝐶1(𝑞1)  
Π2 = 𝑝(𝑞1, 𝑞2). 𝑞2 − 𝐶2(𝑞2)  
 
In which 𝑞1, is the leader’s strategy and 𝑞2 is the follower’s strategy, which determined by the 
leader’s strategy, therefore 𝑞2 is a function of 𝑞1.  
Functions 𝐶1(𝑞1) and 𝐶2(𝑞2) are also the cost functions of these two players, respectively. To 
ease the calculation burden, 𝐶1(𝑞1) and 𝐶2(𝑞2) are assumed depend on one player's strategy. 
Also, the function 𝑝(𝑞1, 𝑞2) is assumed the follow the below form: 
𝑝(𝑞1, 𝑞2) = (𝑎 − 𝑏(𝑞1 + 𝑞2)) 
 
The Stackelberg game structure requires the leader to determine its strategy first. As discussed before, the 
leader considers the impacts of its decisions on followers’ decisions, since the followers’ strategies affect 
the leader's utilization as well.  
Therefore, first, the follower's best response to the leader movement must be calculated as a function of 
the leader's selected strategy. The best response to the follower's utility function is the value of 𝑞2, with 
the assumption of knowing 𝑞1, leads to a maximization of Π2 (the follower's utility function). So with the 
assumption of knowing the leader’s output, the output that maximizes the utility of the follower is 
calculated. So, to find the maximum value of Π2 with respect to 𝑞2, we calculate derivative of Π2 with 
respect to 𝑞2 and then equalize the derived equation to zero. 
 
𝜕Π2
𝜕𝑞2
=
𝜕𝑝(𝑞1,𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞2
. 𝑞2 + 𝑝(𝑞1, 𝑞2)  −
𝜕𝐶2(𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞2
= 0 (6-2) 
 
The values of 𝑞2 which satisfies the above equation are the best responses. 
By substituting (6-2) in the above equation and solving it for q2, the following equation achieves the best 
response of the follower to 𝑞1:  
 
𝑞2 = 𝑞2(𝑞1) =
𝑎 − 𝑏𝑞1 −
𝜕𝐶2(𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞2
2𝑏
 
Now, we evaluate the best response function. This function is calculated by considering the output of the 
follower as a function of the output of the leader. 
The leader understands that selecting 𝑞1, results in selecting 𝑞2  by followers (based on equation (8-2)) as 
the best response to 𝑞1.  Therefore, the leader can calculate  its maximum utility by substituting the above 
equation in its utility function. In this regard, we take the derivative of Π1 with respect to 𝑞1 and equalize 
that equation to zero. 
𝜕Π1
𝜕𝑞1
=
𝜕𝑝(𝑞1, 𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞2
.
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑞1
. 𝑞1 + 𝑝(𝑞1, 𝑞2(𝑞1))  −
𝜕𝐶1(𝑞1)
𝜕𝑞1
= 0    (9 − 2) 
 
 
By solving the above equation for  𝑞1, we obtain the optimal move for the leader as,  
𝑞1
∗ =
𝑎 +
𝜕𝐶2(𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞2
− 2.
𝜕𝐶1(𝑞1)
𝜕𝑞1
2𝑏
         (10 − 2) 
 
This value is the leader’s best response to the reaction of a follower at the equilibrium point. Now, we can 
find the value of the follower utility by substituting the above equation in the follower’s reaction function 
that was previously derived (equation (8-2)): 
 
𝑞2
∗ =
𝑎 − 𝑏.
𝑎 +
𝜕𝐶2(𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞2
− 2.
𝜕𝐶1(𝑞1)
𝜕𝑞1
2𝑏 −
𝜕𝐶2(𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞2
2𝑏
      (11 − 2) 
The resulting equation is: 
𝑞2
∗ =
𝑎 − 3.
𝜕𝐶2(𝑞2)
𝜕𝑞2
+ 2.
𝜕𝐶1(𝑞1)
𝜕𝑞1
4𝑏
       (12 − 2) 
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium points of the game, are all possible (𝑞1
∗, 𝑞2
∗) responses (derived using 
equations (10-2) and (12-2)). 
 
 
 
3. Conclusion: 
  Operation of power system is influenced by multiple entities with different and often 
conflicting interests. These entities compete in the pursuit of their self-interests. Game theory is a 
strong tool for modeling this competition between decision-making entities.  In this book 
chapter, we presented properties of game theory in an effort to motivate power system 
researchers to use this powerful tool. We also briefly discussed multiple problems that can be 
modeled as a game. Finally, we presented a detailed discussion for one of the popular game 
theory problem formulations and provided an example to clarify its implementation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Reference 
 
[1] S. Mei, W. Wei, and F. Liu, "On engineering game theory with its application in power systems," Control 
Theory and Technology, vol. 15, pp. 1-12, 2017. 
[2] N. Singh and X. Vives, "Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly," The RAND Journal of 
Economics, pp. 546-554, 1984. 
[3] David, A. Kumar, and Fushuan Wen. "Strategic bidding in competitive electricity markets: a literature 
survey." Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting, vol. 4, pp. 2168-2173, 2000. 
[4] X. Hu and D. Ralph, "Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with 
locational prices," Operations research, vol. 55, pp. 809-827, 2007. 
[5] Nwulu, Nnamdi I., and Xiaohua Xia. "Multi-objective dynamic economic emission dispatch of electric 
power generation integrated with game theory based demand response programs." Energy Conversion and 
Management, vol 89, pp.  963-974, 2015. 
[6] S. Mei, W. Guo, Y. Wang, F. Liu, and W. Wei, "A game model for robust optimization of power systems 
and its application," Proceedings of the CSEE, vol. 33, pp. 47-56, 2013. 
[7] W. Wei, "Power System Robust Dispatch: Models and Applications," Tsinghua University, 2013. 
[8] Mediwaththe, Chathurika P., and David B. Smith. "Game-Theoretic Electric Vehicle Charging 
Management Resilient to Non-Ideal User Behavior." IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation 
Systems (2018). 
[9] Shinde, Priyanka, and Kesasanakurty Shanti Swarup. "Stackelberg game-based demand response in 
multiple utility environments for electric vehicle charging." IET Electrical Systems in Transportation 
(2018). 
[10] W. W. Weaver and P. T. Krein, "Game-theoretic control of small-scale power systems," IEEE Transactions 
on Power Delivery, vol. 24, pp. 1560-1567, 2009. 
[11] H. Chen, R. Ye, X. Wang, and R. Lu, "Cooperative control of power system load and frequency by using 
differential games," IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology, vol. 23, pp. 882-897, 2015. 
[12] Lee, C. W., Simon KK Ng, J. Zhong, and Felix F. Wu. "Transmission expansion planning from past to 
future." In Power Systems Conference and Exposition, pp. 257-265. IEEE, 2006. 
[13] B. Wang, Y. Wu, and K. R. Liu, "Game theory for cognitive radio networks: An overview," Computer 
networks, vol. 54, pp. 2537-2561, 2010. 
[14] K. R. Liu and B. Wang, Cognitive radio networking and security: A game-theoretic view: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010. 
[15] M. Felegyhazi and J.-P. Hubaux, "Game theory in wireless networks: A tutorial," 2006. 
[16] P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, "Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with strategic 
complementarities," Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pp. 1255-1277, 1990. 
 
 
 
 
